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ABSTRACT 
 Tunisia’s reputation as the success story from the Arab Spring rests on the 
integration of a stable democratic regime. Domestic as well as regional threats continue 
to push the boundaries of this fledgling democracy. Development measures, and reform 
of the Tunisian Internal Security Forces are paramount for the state’s survival. This work 
presents measures for Security Sector Reform within Tunisia, then proceeds to create a 
map a developmental intervention aimed at securing stability through several drivers. 
Understanding that development is a security threat for Tunisia will help allies, other 
regional actors, NGO’s, and other organizations furthers the unique situation where 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Located in the Maghreb, Tunisia is the northernmost country in the continent of 
Africa. Its border to the west and south is Algeria and to the east and south is Libya and 
the Mediterranean Sea sits north of Tunisia. Algeria’s strict border security has not 
affected relations with Tunisia, and the two currently enjoy good relations. Gaddafi’s 
downfall in 2011 has left Libya in turmoil and civil war strife. Loose border security 
policies and the desert shared between Libya and Tunisia’s southwestern border creates 
an open area for smuggling and trafficking of goods and humans. Tunisia focuses on its 
internal affairs and security, preferring to stabilize its own people and state over meddling 
in the affairs of its neighbors.  
The Arab Spring movement of 2011 transformed the landscape of North Africa. 
Tunisia, hailed as the success story of the movement, established a democratic regime 
after ousting autocratic leader Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Police harassment and high 
unemployment led Mohamed Bouazizi to perform self-immolation in December 2010. 
Ben Ali proceeded to flee to Saudi Arabia in early January, then Tunisia began the 
process of creating a democracy and free elections. In neighboring Libya, rebels backed 
by the West and several Arab states toppled the Gaddafi regime after six months of 
fighting.1  
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After promising a democratic state, Libya has been engulfed in militia and rebel 
fighting, currently between pro-government forces, rebels, and various jihadist and 
terrorist groups. Tunisia and Libya’s shared desert border became and continues to be 
used as a transport spot for Islamic State (IS) fighters who wish to enter training camps 
and IS strongholds.  Lacking border controls continue to pose problems for both Tunisian 
and Libyan forces.2 Ineffective security measures from Tunisia’s Internal Security Forces 
(ISF) have allowed for jihadists and terrorists to move freely between Libya and Tunisia, 
further destabilizing Libya and beginning to seriously affect the Tunisian government.  
1.1 Why Tunisia? 
As we are now five years into the Arab Spring, we ask why Tunisia? Egypt, Syria, 
Iraq, Libya, and Yemen are engulfed in conflict, yet Tunisia is continuously praised as 
the success in the region. The Tunisian state was chosen for this study because of its 
stability in a region strife with conflict. Islamist party Ennhada’s voluntary step-down 
from power because of fear among the civilian population demonstrates a maturity not 
normally seen in the region.  
However, many reasons exist to state why Tunisia should not be in this position. 
The largest number of Islamic State fighters hail from Tunisia, it is a former autocracy, 
the military is exceptionally strong, and the state is Arab-dominated. Several factors 
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dissuade the state from falling into upheaval. Though Tunisia exports the highest number 
of IS fighters, the population at large does not support extremist and jihadist activities. As 
an Arab-dominated state, the disapproval and fear from the Ennhada-led Islamist party 
and the party’s subsequent step-down from power demonstrates maturity. Second, the 
military, while strong, refused to help Ben Ali in suppressing the demonstrates against his 
regime. Leaders in the military understand their role is apolitical. The group does not 
wish to interfere in domestic and political affairs, and believe the ISF and its National 
Guard should control internal affairs.  
History and the implementation of a secular government over religious 
domination also paves the path for a stable democracy. Even before autocracy was 
demolished, for example, the rights of women and education evolved greatly. Women 
held the right to vote early on in Tunisia’s statehood, and the high levels of education 
across primary, secondary, and tertiary levels complement the state’s development. Even 
though high unemployment currently plagues the democracy and was a large reason for 
Ben Ali’s ousting, the secular government and its establishment as such paves the road 
for stability.  
Further, the upgrade in ally status of Tunisia from the United States means 
Western nations speculate a strong future for the state within Middle East North Africa 
(MENA). As of 10 July 2015 President Barack Obama noted intent to designate Tunisia 
as a Major Non-NATO ally (MNNA).3 This change in ally status shows the United States 
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appreciation in Tunisia’s decision to “join the world’s democracies” and appropriates the 
necessity of increasing Western allies in MENA.  
Development, especially in this case, is a security matter. Creating a strong 
economic base will provide the framework for a lasting democratic regime. The work in 
this paper uses PPP of GDP for its data instead of overall GDP. While PPP is not accurate 
for each region within Tunisia, it is the strongest indicator to demonstrate how the 
creation of an economic base for strength and stability will lead to higher security.  
Incidents of terrorism were few and far between during the autocratic regimes that 
ruled Tunisia before the Jasmine Revolution. Data from the Global Terrorism Database 
(GTB) finds that from the first year the database began (1970) until the end of calendar 
year 2010 there were eighteen incidents of terrorism.4 From January 2011 until the end of 
calendar year 2014 GTD recorded fifty-six incidents of terrorism within Tunisia. The 
sharp increase in terrorist incidents matches perfectly with the end of the Bel Ali regime 
and the implementation of democracy. The implementation of civil liberties that come 
with democracy were new to not only the citizens, who relished the newfound freedom, 
but also to the government’s security apparatus’, which did not have an updated code of 
conduct of mission statement since the Ben Ali regime fell. The slow start to reforming 
the security sectors influenced the security situation in Tunisia into where it lies today.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 These data include two criterions for an incident to count as a terrorist activity; first, the act must be 
aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal; second, there must be evidence of an 
intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the 
immediate events.  An attack is defined as includes assassinations, armed assaults, bombings/explosions, 
hijacking, hostage taking (barricade incident), hostage taking (kidnapping), facility/infrastructure attack, 
unarmed assault, and unknown. The aggregation of incidents includes both unsuccessful and ambiguous 





1.2 Background Literature 
Several studies provide necessary background and framework for the completion 
of this work. The first work cited is David D. Laitin and Jacob N. Shapiro’s “The 
Political, Economic, and Organizational Sources of Terrorism.” Working to prevent 
terrorism in Tunisia before it becomes a highly significant expenditure of government 
spending needs organizational policy measures to succeed. It should be noted that once a 
group takes terrorist tactics over more conventional measures to promote change, the act 
of terrorism becomes self-perpetuating.5 Fighting terrorism itself moves funds away from 
investment spending and into government spending.6 Tunisia’s clouded Internal Security 
Force exists as a mystery to all except those who run it. Instead of increasing spending to 
the organization without transparency and a history of corruption, the ISF must take 
reform to develop its transparency and efficiency.  
Laitin and Shapiro further state that terror and counterterrorism’s use “should be 
considered a development issue.”7 Security of a state, both internally and externally, is a 
development issue. This paper deals solely with Tunisia’s internal security situation and 
recommended reforms. The cleavage between the ISF and the government, both of the 
legislative Assembly of the Representatives of the People (ARP) and President’s office, 
allows for increasing levels of jihadist and terrorist activity. Jihadist and terrorist groups 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Laitin, David D., and Jacob N. Shapiro. “The Political, Economic, and Organizational Sources of 
Terrorism,” in Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness, Edited by Philip Keefer and 
Norman Loayza, 209. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
 
6 Ibid, 210.  
 





have higher effectiveness in democracies where the law makes it easier for groups to 
survive and grow.8 Without significant changes in the ISF and its relations with the 
government, Tunisia cannot hope to establish a stable and secure environment to both 
expel and prevent jihadist and terrorist activity from rising and the overall state 
succumbing to the chaos in the surrounding region.  
S. Brock Bloomberg and Gregory D. Hess’s work demonstrates two important 
principles. First, it shows that “higher income is negatively related to terrorism in poor 
countries.”9 Second, the analysis demonstrates the need for the creation and 
implementation of policies that encourage income growth.10 The importance of their 
work lies in the necessity to develop Tunisia into a less corrupt and more transparent 
state. This paper uses the Pardee Center for International Futures program to demonstrate 
how increasing development indicators through intervention can increase income, among 
other factors, and decrease corruption in the government. Encouraging income growth 
promotes stability in a state because citizens become more engaged in the economy and 
vie for its continued success and stability.  
Peter Chalk and Kim Cragin of RAND found that social and economic 
development has the ability to inhibit a resurgence of terrorism.11 The authors conducted 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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9 S. Brock Bloomberg and Gregory D. Hess. “The Temporal Links Between Conflict and Economic 
Activity,” in Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness, Edited by Philip Keefer and 
Norman Loayza, 107. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
 
10 Ibid, 108.  
 
11 Peter Chalk and Kim Cragin, Terrorism & Development Using Social and Economic Development to 






their study and procured six major findings. First, social and economic development 
policies can weaken local support for terrorist activities. Second, social and economic 
development can discourage terrorist recruits. Third, inadequately funded social and 
economic policies are likely to inflate expectations and renew support for terrorism. 
Fourth, the ability of development policies to inhibit terrorism depends on their 
implementation. Fifth, social and economic development policies can be used as a stick 
to discourage terrorism. And finally, social and economic development policies do not 
eliminate terrorism. This final point is extremely important: It is not the goal of this work 
to create a plan to eliminate terrorism. Instead, this work seeks to further stabilize the 
Tunisian government to create a flourishing democracy in the region.  
Seung-What Choi’s 2015 work conducts an economic study finding that 
“economic growth is not a cure-all solution for terrorism…[and] healthy economic 
conditions are, without doubt, beneficial to the war on terrorism because the majority of 
suicide attacks occur in only a few countries.”12 This work holds new findings through 
the conduction of Choi’s work. Economic growth is divided between agriculture and 
industrial instead of using economic growth as a single indicator. Choi sees that higher 
industrial economic growth is associated with decreasing and lower levels of 
international and domestic terrorist threats. However, higher levels of industrial growth 
associate’s itself with increased suicide attacks. Again, Choi’s work does not state that 
economic development is a cure for terrorism. Instead, he finds that social cleavages 
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between the rich and poor does not necessarily associate with increased terrorist activity. 
Although Choi does not see increased economic development as a one-cure solution for 
terrorism, he does see a healthy economy as beneficial to fighting terrorism because “the 
majority of suicide attacks occur in only a few countries.”13 This study takes social and 
political reform coupled with economic development indicators in order to create a well-
rounded policy to increase Tunisia’s democratic stability and ability to drive back 
increased terrorist activity on its eastern borders in Libya. Aaron Gold and Sambuddah 
Ghatak find that highly developed countries are less likely to have terrorist attacks than 
those who are lesser developed.14 Working with literature from the Pardee Center as well 
as studies conducted from think tanks, governments, and private corporations provide 
strong literature for analysis. 
This work creates two intervention scenarios spanning across development 
indicators in order to establish the stability needed for democracy to flourish. The 
International Futures program from the Pardee Center for International Futures at the 
University of Denver is used for this study. Drivers are used to create scenarios from 
which forecasted changes are measured against the Base Case of current data. Drivers for 
this study are the rate of tertiary graduation, the level of economic freedom, and the level 
of multi-factor productivity. Variables for this study, including definitions and 
assumptions, are as follows: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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14 Aaron Gold and Sambuddah Ghatak, “Development, discrimination and domestic terrorism: Looking 





I.! Freedom History Plus Forecast: Derived from Freedom House 
measures. The Freedom in the World survey contains reports on 
192 countries and 15 related and disputed territories. Each country 
report begins with a section containing basic political, economic, 
and social data arranged in the following categories: polity, 
economy, population, purchasing power parities (PPP), life 
expectancy, religious groups, ethnic groups, capital, political 
rights, civil liberties, and status (free, partly free, or not free). 
Freedom House has been publishing annual yearbook since 1978.15 
II.! Democracy Level, Polity (Negative 10 to 10): The Polity 
conceptual scheme is unique in that it examines concomitant 
qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in governing 
institutions, rather than discreet and mutually exclusive forms of 
governance. This perspective envisions a spectrum of governing 
authority that spans from fully institutionalized autocracies through 
mixed, or incoherent, authority regimes (termed "anocracies") to 
fully institutionalized democracies. The "Polity Score" captures 
this regime authority spectrum on a 21-pont scale ranging from -10 
(hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The 
Polity scores can also be converted into regime categories in a 
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suggested three part categorization of "autocracies" (-10 to -6), 
"anocracies" (-5 to +5 and three special values: -66, -77 and -88), 
and "democracies" (+6 to +10).16#
III.! Governance Corruption (TI) Higher Score Means Less Corrupt: 
Corruption is a function of past corruption level, GDP per capita 
(inverse), energy trade dependence, democracy (inverse), gender 
empowerment (inverse), and probability of intrastate conflict.17 
IV.! Economic Freedom: The Fraser Institute is an independent non-
partisan research and educational organization based in Canada. Its 
annual Economic Freedom of the World report, uses 42 distinct 
pieces of data to measure economic freedom in 141 nations from 
1970 to 2007.18 
 
Tunisia’s security and future as the success story of the Arab Spring depends on 
establishing a new internal security policy. Before any intervention to increase income, 
productivity, or economic freedom can be implemented, the government needs to reform 
the ISF not only to work with the government but also to gain favor from its citizens. The 
divide between the public and the government threatens the efficacy of the Tunisian 
government and the status of the state as a whole. Reform of the ISF to introduce 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 “The Polity Project,” Center for Systematic Peace, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html. 
 







transparency and accountability measures as an object not fully independent of the 
government, as it exists now, is the primary need to establish security. After the ISF 
reforms enact, the state can then begin fighting corruption in its own bureaucracy to 
ameliorate its relationship with the public and work against the jihadist and terrorist 
threat facing Tunisia. Internal security, and to a greater effect the fight against terrorism, 
is a development concern. Without organizational policies that create a transparent 
security force and enforcement mechanisms, Tunisia will fall to the threat of terrorism. 
This work outlines the reform measures the government must make with the ISF, 
including difficulties that remain even after Ben Ali’s ousting, in order to create a base of 
security, and follows with an intervention scenario that promotes long-term stability 











CHAPTER TWO: PRIMARY REFORM NEEDS FOR SECURITY 
Dissident among the Internal Security Force and the military plays a large role in 
preventing Tunisia’s growth. The role of the police during the Jasmine Revolution, who 
had the most to lose with Ben Ali’s ousting, has left the force resented by the public and 
military. Struggles from the authorities to deal with rising jihadist activity demonstrates 
the necessity of reform for the ISF. Resistance from the ISF on reforms has resulted in a 
stall between the Assembly of the People’s Representatives (ARP) internal forces. 
Several reforms must be made to prevent a further rise in jihadism and preserve Tunisia’s 
new government. First, tensions between the ISF and the military, as well as citizens, 
must be smoothed. Working to hold those accountable for human rights abuses and 
removing the immunity of ISF members is the most important reform, and thus has been 
met with the highest resistance. Second, the lack of transparency in the ISF and 
overlapping duties between departments alludes to the Ben Ali regime and the ability of 
the ISF to maneuver and take actions with little to no responsibility. As seen through the 
internal development reforms in this paper, corruption and a lack of transparency hinders 
development of an effective government. The ineffectiveness of the security sector 





only attacks on borders but also within the capital and inland.19 Moving out of the ISF 
doctrine of Politics of Fear and into an era of transparency and trust between the citizens 
and security forces is a precursor for the continuance of this government.  
Security, according to Tunisia’s citizens, is considered the single-greatest problem 
facing the state.20 The culture of impunity surrounding Tunisia’s police force continues to 
impose problems and further the divide with civil society. Police unions were 
immediately established after the fall of Ben Ali.21 These unions argue for high 
socioeconomic status and legislation protecting their jobs. Passing this legislation can be 
seen as a continuation of the privileges enjoyed under the Ben Ali regime. In order for 
any sort of Security Sector Reform (SSR) to come about, both the ISF and the APR must 
understand that direct confrontation will not yield successful results. Reform of the 
security sector does not mean better or more high-equipped counter-terrorism units: 
Rather, reforming the structure, purpose, and transparency of the security sector serves to 
strengthen the state overall. The rapidly-deteriorating regional situation signifies that SSR 
needs to happen now – further lack of a concrete plan from the government and the ISF 
will only leave Tunisia vulnerable to further crises.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Ömer Taşpınar. "The Problem with Radicalism," The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Fall 2015, 
Accessed February 09, 2016. http://thecairoreview.com/essays/the-problem-with-radicalism/. 
 
20"Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion, June 22 - July 1, 2014," International Republican Institute, February 
2014. http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014 August 19 Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion, June 22-
July 1, 2014_0.pdf. 
 







2.1 Reforms from Legislative Body 
The role of the political class, as the legislative body, will be to overhaul the 
current standards in conjunction with the ISF. This will prevent the public’s fear of the 
police and also show the commitment to the democratic regime. Many security 
apparatus’ have not changed operationally since Ben Ali remained in power. Class divide 
between citizens of the interior and the ISF has damaged the reputation of the group, and 
increased terrorist attacks serves to further isolate the ISF. Strong opinion of the army, 
who refused to follow Ben Ali during the Jasmine Revolution, has led to calls for it to 
take on a greater role in protecting domestic security. The increasingly fragile state of 
security in Tunisia has led some to question what the government plans to do regarding 
public policy towards security, as nothing concrete has formed. The following reforms 
highlight what the state needs to do in order to create the base-layer of security needed to 
increase Tunisia’s development in an ever-deteriorating region.  
 
I. The government must not decrease the use of the ISF by placing responsibilities 
in the hands of the army. Placing the national army in control of aspects like 
border control and traffic police duties may increase security in the short-term, 
but it would not provide long-term stability. Adding too much power to the 
military will increase fears from citizens and politicians alike that the branch 
could gain enough momentum to stage a coup.22 The role of the ISF is important 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 "Reform and Security Strategy in Tunisia," International Crisis Group.,July 23, 2015. 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle East North Africa/North Africa/Tunisia/161-reform-and-





and vital for Tunisia’s survival – decreasing its power would demonstrate a lack 
of faith in a government whose sweeping reform in regime change garnered a 
Nobel Peace prize. Merely sidestepping the problems in the ISF would not 
contribute to solving the lack of transparency and corruption that truly underlies 
the lack of security facing Tunisia. Severing an integral role of the ISF not only 
would demonstrate a lack of want to reform, but also a lack in communication 
between the government and the group.  
 
II.  The ARP and the ISF must meet and jointly create a reform for the ISF that 
maintains the independence of the latter while increasing transparency and 
decreasing arbitrary management. Previous attempts at reform independent of 
ISF contribution have led nowhere.23 In order to create an effective SSR, the ARP 
and ISF must undertake several steps for the code’s creation. First, the ISF should 
undertake internal evaluations of its employees from all levels in order to 
understand what an ISF worker believes is his/her profession in the post-Ben Ali 
era. Though there have not been changes legislatively, there has been a change in 
opinion of duties with the new government and the want to bridge the gap 
between police and military and police and citizen relations.  
 
Second, the creation of a committee jointly run by members of the ISF and the 







ISF.24 This committee will draft a new code of conduct for the ISF, along with 
proper management and disciplinary rules and regulations. The goal of the code 
of conduct is to create competent and high-quality levels of security services 
within Tunisia. This code will provide the legal revision that citizens and the 
political class has called for since the government’s establishment. Creating a 
clear mission for the ISF, specific job duties for each position, and a hierarchical 
structure that prevents the extreme overlap currently present as well as increase 
transparency within the ISF are mandatory to establish a successful SSR. A 
national security directive must also be established so that the ARP can publicly 
announce a plan of action to decrease jihadism and terrorist activity throughout 
the state.  
 
III. Increase communication between the Executive Branch, the ARP, and the ISF 
to ensure transparency and maintain a clear plan of action for Tunisia’s security. 
The independence of each branch of government and of the ISF works to maintain 
the democratic structure of this government. Communication among the three, 
whose common goal is to maintain Tunisia’s security, should occur at least bi-
annually in times of peace and increase during times of conflict or crisis. Each 
governmental organ’s understanding of the roles, actions taken, and actions 
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24 Though others, such as the Crisis Group report in the previous footnote, wish to state the ISF should 
reform itself, it is necessary that there be some commonality between the ARP and the ISF. A collaboration 
between the two organs will not only increase government efficiency, but also help integrate the ISF into 
the government in such as way that it no longer exists as an organ shrouded in secrecy and no transparency. 
Though the ISF should maintain much of its independence status and not be completely controlled by the 





planned in maintaining security takes high precedence to create the baseline of 
security that Tunisia needs in order to move forward in its development.  
 
IV. Ameliorate the relationship between the ISF and the public through increased 
transparency. Establish multiple public forums throughout the country in order to 
reach those living in the interior and borders. Different problems and tensions 
between the ISF and public exist depending on regional location.25 The purpose of 
these forums is to discredit assumptions about the ISF and state the goals of the 
ISF’s various security institutions in order to dispel the shroud of confusion 
among Tunisia’s citizens. These forums should also outline the threats facing the 
ISF, including jihadism and terrorism as well as other illegal activity that occurs 
within state borders, in order for the public to better understand why the ISF has 
various departments and their roles in promoting security. Mending the 
relationship between the ISF and the public will also help relieve some tensions 
between the police and the military. Standing at different poles during the Jasmine 
Revolution, the relationship between the two will mend when transparent goals 
are established, proclaimed, and the military sees the police and the ISF as a 
whole working to establish itself as a viable and trustworthy organization.  
 
V. Use the international community to help establish resource management and 
budget transparency instead of just equipping security forces and anti-terrorism 
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units. International efforts, stemming from Western Europe and the United States, 
primarily root themselves in equipping security forces.26,27 While arming ISF to 
perform its job is vital to success, the lack of transparency towards budgets and 
little to no resource management continues to plague the organization. These 
states wish to increase the effectiveness of the ISF, but without proper planning, 
training, and measures to increase transparency jihadist and terrorist attacks will 
continue their increase. Improving democratic governance and transparency are 
not currently goals of these programs. Creation of a comprehensive engagement 
program that trains the ISF, increases budget transparency, and continues to help 
arm forces is better suited than current programs.  
 
The implementation of these reforms is the primary step to establish security in 
Tunisia. Baseline establishment of security must be met before any further reforms to 
increase security and the strength of the government. The role of the ISF is vital to 
Tunisia’s success as a democratic regime. SSR needs to revolve around the ISF’s lack of 
transparency and tensions it holds with the military and the public. Increased jihadist and 
terrorist activity and threats throughout Tunisia and the surrounding region placate the 
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26 "Décret N°2014-987 Du 27 Janvier 2014 Portant Ratification D'un Protocole D'accord Entre Le 
Gouvernement De La République Tunisienne Et Le Gouvernement Du Royaume D'Espagne Pour La Mise 
En œuvre Du Projet « Renforcement Des Capacités Des Agents Des Prisons." La Législation Du Secteur 
De La Sécurité En Tunisie: Accès Aux Lois, Décrets Et Autres Textes Juridiques Consolidés Et Mis À 
Jour. January 27, 2014. Accessed February 09, 2016. http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/33514. 
 








necessity for immediate SSR. Reform will only come through communication, 
compromise, and relieved tensions between the ISF and the rest of the country.  
The importance of this work lies in reforming Tunisia’s ISF to provide further 
transparency decreasing corruption through quantifiable measures. However, it is 
important to know that everything is not quantifiable. Understanding that seemingly 
random, catastrophic events can quickly and drastically change the course of a state 
cannot be understated. Due to these events’ unpredictability this work does not take their 
occurrence into account, although the imperative aspect is to understand that state-









CHAPTER THREE: DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTION 
 Following the events of January 2011, Tunisia overthrew its autocratic regime 
leader Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali to establish a democracy. Many drivers pushed this 
movement; among them are high levels of unemployment, a highly educated and 
plentiful youth population, and a government that only responded to the political and 
economic elite.28 As of September 2015 a permanent democracy has been established, 
ruled by the moderate Nidaa Tounis party. However, security within the state enters a 
state of crisis as increased terrorist activity and conflict in neighboring Libya overflows 
into Tunisia.  
This section will provide background information, history, and the context of 
what drivers work to forecast the security situation inside of the state. The background 
information will include population and education demographic trends in the years 
leading up to and through the Jasmine Revolution. Another interesting driver this work 
will investigate is the presence of democracy. Democratic trends will be extremely new 
because of the autocracy’s overthrow in 2011, but the indicators of democracy over time 
will demonstrate how the state moves during autocracy, during the regime change, and 
the establishment of a democratic regime and its principles. Following the presentation to 
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answer the question, “Where are we now and why,” what can be expected in the future 
and a discussion of this model’s drivers that influence this scenario.  
The models and scenarios created for this study will use the International Futures 
model located at the University of Denver’s Pardee Center for International Futures. 
Because International Futures relies on aggregated data and conditions from reliable and 
trustworthy sources, the forecasted future projections and changes in variables create 
plausible forecast trends that can be used in comparison. Use of these models in this 
paper will cover the demographics used in this study in their current state and run 
scenarios of where they can expect to move.  
3.1 Background & Conceptual Framework 
One of the newest goals of the Tunisian government is to decrease the high level 
of unemployment plaguing its population. Unemployment in the final years of the Ben 
Ali regime climbed steadily (12.44% to 13.05%) then jumped after the regime fell to 
18.90%. Though the unemployment level decreased from the establishment of a 
democratic regime (down 11.47% to 16.72% in 2012, to 15.33% in 2013, to 15.3% in 
2014), the decreases are slowing to an incredibly high rate bringing uncertainty into the 
future of the economy. Youth unemployment (defined as unemployment of those aged 
15-25) has risen from 2010 levels, climbing from 28.30% to 31.20%. In the youth 
unemployment data, males are more likely to be unemployed than women, creating a 






Several drivers exist behind Tunisia’s current levels of corruption. This 
deliverable focuses most heavily on the corruption in the educational system that feeds 
into corruption within the bureaucracy. Also, high levels of inequality among an educated 
populous drives levels of corruption and decreases GDP per Capita. Further, economic 
freedom levels are rising but the overall corruption levels of the bureaucracy mean 
citizens are wary of their government, creating a rift in the relationship between 
population and government. The gap between the citizens and the government is one of 
the reasons Tunisia is not developing as quickly as possible. However, working to mend 
the gap between the two while also working to combat corruption from the base levels 
will create a new generation that will enter the workforce without having lived through a 
corrupt education system. Because many students attend university in order to obtain the 
prerequisite for a government job, those who attend and matriculate through tertiary 
education will be those who not only attended university with the skills to complete 
education but also wish to learn. Further, decreasing corruption and melding the 
relationship between citizens and the government will create an environment that fosters 
economic freedom vitality throughout the economy. The chart below demonstrates how 
and where corruption exists and and how the circle between education and bureaucracy 
feeds its continuation.29 
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29 Data and work on the drivers of corruption can be found in Kate Lapham’s “Cleaning up Tunisian 
Education (16 July 2013), Dor Srebernik’s “Inequality and Corruption: Drivers of Tunisia’s Revolution” 
(2014), and Mihaylo Milovanovitch’s “Trust and Institutional Corruption: The Case of Education in 





































 Tunisia’s population is 10.55 million people (2010) growing at a rate of 0.92% 
annually. Sixty-six point three percent of the total population lives in urban areas and 
urbanization is growing at an annual rate of +1.34%. As the chart below demonstrates, 
there is a strong youth bulge among the working age population, and the next generation 
appears to also be high in youth as well, although not to the youth bulge level facing the 
state today.  
 The distribution of the populations among males and females are also generally 




shows that the 
age groups with 
the majority of 
the population 
are those in the 
working age. The 
female population tends to 
live longer than their counterpart, although this demonstrates a difference in lifestyles and 
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30 Although it is common the in the 0-4 age range there are more males born than females. More boys/men 
die than their female cohorts, so this statistics should not raise concerns. 
Figure Three. Youth Bulge, Percent of Adult Population Between 15 





health habits between the two genders. The groups of 20-29 are the most distressed group 
in the Tunisian population. High levels of secondary- and tertiary-level education and the 
lack of available employment opportunities were two of the driving factors behind the 
establishment of democratic rule. If the population continues to grow at its current 
estimated rate of 0.92% per annum, then the government will have to increase its ability 
to contain unemployment to lower levels than it has seen in the past. This style of 
population growth, if continued, also dictates a forecasted sharp drop in the youth bulge 
where it eventually levels off in 2025-2035 and then falls even lower into 2050.  
3.3 Education 
The enseignement de base (primary education) is compulsory and divided into six 
years of primary and three years of preparatory, also known as lower secondary. Students 
are tested in both Arabic and French with a higher emphasis on Arabic reading, writing, 
and comprehension due to the Arabization phase in the region31 after independence. 
Primary education levels during the Ben Ali regime in 1997-2011 fluctuated but stayed 
above 94%, growing quickly with the new millennium and dropping again five years 
later. There was a quick jump in primary education enrollment levels in 2009, but these 
quickly fell again and have continued to fall since. Even though the education rate levels 
have dropped sharply since 2009, enrollment has not dropped below 94.5% since before 
2000. Further, the establishment of a permanent parliament and government constitutes 
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31 Arabization occurred shortly after states in the Maghreb gained independence from France. This 
movement involved removing French language from the culture entirely (street names, used as compulsory 
language in education) and renaming/restructuring society towards embracing Arabic as a homage to 





one of the driving factors that primary education enrollment will increase and continue to 




Figure Four. Education Enrollment of Primary Students Net Percentage, History and Forecast. Made with 
International Futures. 
 
 Enseignement secondaire (secondary education) is open to all who successfully 
finish primary and lower secondary. After one year of secondary, students choose one of 
five specializations, where instruction in technical, scientific, and mathematical fields is 
taught in French, while the other specializations (language arts, economics, and 
management) are taught in Arabic. After the fourth year, students sit the Examen 
National du Baccalauréat, where, if passed, students are guaranteed place at a university. 





were enrolled in secondary education. Since 2010 the number has only grown, forecasted 
to keep increasing as time continues. Predictions state that the higher enrollment and 
education levels will lead to a higher sophistication within the economy and a more 
technical work force.  
 
 
Figure Five. Secondary Education Net Enrollment Rate, History and Forecast. Created with International Futures.  
 
 Tertiary education is centrally controlled through the système national 
d’orientation universitaire which uses an algorithm to meet the ministry-set quota for 
each field of study and university. It is not popular among students because it does not 
mean that they always get to choose their choices. Grading scales are similar to France, 
where students must achieve at least a ten out of twenty in order to pass a course. 





begin a program at a Tunisia university fail to graduate. Although enrollment in tertiary 
education is growing, many students emigrate to France or other European institutions for 
university. This can be linked to the strong informational and technical science programs 
in France and the fact that secondary institutions teach these course trajectories in French.  
3.4 Democracy 
 Democracy, as previously stated in this paper, is a new working concept for the 
Tunisian government and its citizens. Increased civil liberties and freedoms are, as an 
effect of democracy’s implementation, also new to the state. While the establishment of a 
democratic regime works to reverse the Ben Ali regime’s oppression, there are areas in 
which this fledgling government needs to improve. Without improvement in several 









Figure Six. Freedom History plus Future Forecast. Created with International Futures. 
 
Figure Six clearly shows the drop in freedom within Tunisia in the years before the Arab 
Spring. A slight drop to just below 4.0 on the index shows that in 2011 freedom was at an 
all time low in Tunisia, though it is steadily increasing as democracy has taken hold of 
the state. Tunisia does enjoy unprecedented levels of civil liberties and freedom of speech 
never seen during the Ben Ali regime, but the question is what cost is incurred when a 







Figure Seven. Democracy Level, Polity, Scored from -10 to 10. Created with International Futures.  
 
Figure Seven denotes that Tunisia has clearly moved out from the polity rating denoted as 
autocratic. It is important to note that Ben Ali’s reign started this trend, as he did 
introduce economic and social reform (most notably in the realm of the rights of women), 
but the real movement towards a positive polity will be done through democracy. While 
the score currently classifies Tunisia as an anocracy and the forecast shows it will stay 
this way for a long time, the state’s government clearly is shedding the autocratic 








3.5 Presentation of the Base Cases and Analysis 
 Current projections for Tunisia show the state is on track to decrease government 
corruption over the next ten years. Figure Eight shows that by 2025 the Government 
Corruption (TI) index will move from the current level of 4.35 to 4.54 without any 
changes implemented. However, increasing several parameters within reach of the 
Tunisian economy and government will further decrease government corruption while 
simultaneously moving the state out of a middle income trap. The parameters changed are 
the Multifactor Productive growth additive, the Education Tertiary Graduation rate, and 
the Economic Freedom multiplier. Each parameter’s influence and changes brought are 
analyzed against the current base case to show effects to Tunisia’s development and 
overall internal security situation.  
 
 
Figure Eight. Base Case of Governance Corruption (TI), where a higher index indicates less corruption. 






 Current economic freedom levels of the Base Case for Tunisia show that the 
variable increases as time progresses, albeit not at high levels. In 2015 the measure of 
economic freedom is 6.85, increasing to 6.94 over the next ten years. Tunisia’s level of 
economic freedom did not experience a large jump after regime change denoting that 
changes flexibility of opportunity did not heavily increase with the transition to 
democracy. Increasing economic freedom will not only influence its overall level within 
the state but also serve to aid unemployment levels and increase individual income levels.  
 
 
Figure Nine. Base case of Economic Freedom levels in Tunisia. Figure created with International Futures. 
 
GDP per capita at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) also shows increase for Tunisia’s 
current trajectory. The Base Case shows an increase from $10.80 thousand in 2011 





power in Tunisia will increase almost two thousand dollars over the next ten years: 
However this does not account for projected or actual inflation rates and purchasing 
power is measured in 2011 USD values. Increases in individual PPP will help Tunisia 
move out of the middle income gap, but increases in employment opportunities and 
urbanization calls for more specialized jobs across technical industries. Moving out of the 
middle income trap is key for increasing the internal security situation.  
 
 
Figure Ten. Base Case trajectory for GDP per capita at PPP. Figure created using International Futures. 
 
 The next sections will show the changes in forecasts across each parameter 
changed. While the numbers presented show increases across the board for Tunisia, the 
state will remain in the middle income trap unless changes are made through several 
injections. Moving out of the middle income trap means the state will become more 





economy. As demonstrated in across the international monetary and security regimes an 
economically robust and stable state helps development.  
3.6 Forecasts with Parameter Changes 
 It is important to understand what changes each parameter adds to the scenario 
and overall forecast. This section, at the moment, contains the explanations and analysis 
of three parameters and the changes associated with each’s implementation into the 
scenario. The parameters for this scenario include one additive and two multipliers, each 
influencing a number of variables and the overall trajectory of Tunisia’s development.  
 The first parameter discussed is the Multifactor Productivity Additive (mfpadd). 
An additive changes the equation by adding the input value to the equation over a set 
period of time with a set input annually. This forecast uses an additive of 0.05 for ten 
years, beginning in 2016. The second parameter used is edtergradgr, influencing tertiary 
graduation rates annually through a multiplier. Here we use a multiplier rate of 1.5 for ten 
years beginning in 2016. The third and final parameter for this study is the economic 
freedom multiplier (econfreem). This parameter is set at 1.6 for ten years beginning in 
2016. 2016 is chosen as the start for this forecast because it would not make sense to 
implement changes in a forecast beginning before a time possible for analysis. The 
figures below are presented and analyzed as the base case against the changes in the 
created scenario.  
 Each parameter was chosen because of its ability to influence the state’s internal 
security situation. Multifactor productivity will increase the stock of capital within 





Tunisia out of the middle income trap and continue its trajectory of development 
associated with increased GDP per capita at PPP. Increasing tertiary graduation rates as a 
multiplier was chosen because it helps universities increase the positive effects of a 
university education and will help decrease corruption in the long run. Corruption in 
education is high and across all levels in Tunisia, but tertiary education is where the state 
stands to gain the most. The levels of corruption are discussed in greater detail later. 
Finally, the driver of economic freedom was chosen to demonstrate the power that less 
corruption will have with the relationship between the state and Tunisian citizens. When 
more trust and transparency exist in this relationship we will see a higher level of growth 
within the state.   
 
 







 First, we look at GDP per Capita PPP changes when each of the parameters run 
for ten years at their respective rates. The gains in GDP per Capita at PPP run through the 
new scenario denote an almost three thousand 2011 USD increase in 2025 than the Base 
Case. Tunisia is already highly educated, and the growth rate from tertiary education 
grows during this ten-year period. This is important to note because Tunisia’s population 
is already regarded as highly educated and faces the highest unemployment levels, thus 
the increase in PPP cannot alone be the reason for the increase. The combination of 
multifactor productivity increasing and economic freedom also increasing simultaneously 
lend themselves to higher levels of production and increased economic activity. Although 
this scenario does not take into account inflation, the measurement in 2011 USD denotes 
that the state is on its way to overcoming the middle income trap.  
 
   







 Figure Twelve shows the effect on Economic Freedom with the adjusted 
parameters. Under the base case economic Freedom levels hover just below 7.0 for the 
foreseeable future, with gains under 0.10 for the ten-year period analyzed. Beginning in 
2017 the economic freedom multiplier’s affect has levels at 7.31 until reaching the 
pendulum of a ten on the index in 2024. Figure Twelve does not show the Base Case 
changing as dramatically as Figure Nine because the Index ranking on the y-axis 
accommodates for the increase from the intervention scenario. High economic freedom 
growth is necessary for the Tunisian economy. Currently citizens still have fear about 
branching out or obtaining licenses for entrepreneurial activities, citing government 
corruption as the source. One of the problems the government will face towards 
increasing economic freedom is the stigma that police and bureaucracy do not wish to 
serve the people unless there is some incentive. Even though the Ben Ali regime no 
longer exists, its practices continue to influence aspects of everyday life. This challenge 
will be discussed in further detail later, although it is important to note the importance of 
economic freedom and the challenges faced with its implementation.  
 Several indicators of governance exist with the International Futures program. 
Several are discussed below, weighing the pros and cons of each and analyzing 
effectiveness of the parameters in creating positive change towards Tunisia’s internal 







Figure Thirteen. Governance Effectiveness Base Case versus Adjusted Scenario. Created with 
International Futures. 
 
Figure Thirteen shows the level of Governance Effectiveness with the Base Case plotted 
against the adjusted scenario. Central levels of governance effectiveness include 
corruption levels as well as regulatory quality and effectiveness. Though the Base Case 
sees Tunisia’s level of effectiveness increasing during the ten-year period measured the 
adjusted parameters begin to increase this variable. First moving slowly, the level of 
overall Governance Effectiveness takes off in the year 2019 to increase 0.31 above the 
Base Case by 2025. Looking at the level of Governance Effectiveness is important 
because many analysts look towards Economic Freedom as a measure of it, although the 
debate about doing so is considerable. Thus, noting that the long-term rise in this variable 
takes off and continues growth during the ten-year period of this study provides a 





and remain at the highest level four years before the end of this scenario does not mean 
the government is operating at an extremely high level of effectiveness.  
 
 
Figure Fourteen. Governance Corruption, Base Case and Adjusted Scenario. Created with International 
Futures.  
 
 Figure Fourteen denotes the levels of Government Corruption with both cases. 
The effects of these three parameters are evident as the level of corruption decreases 
almost 0.22 when compared to the base case in 2025. Corruption levels include several 
variable that contribute to its overall level. One of these variables is the GDP per Capita 
at PPP, which as previously discussed, increased over three thousand dollars in the 
adjusted scenario presented in Figure Ten. Polity, discussed below, also shows increases 
over this study. Increasing levels of tertiary education graduation rates and economic 





government is an important factor to focus on towards internal security. Increasing 
transparency of the bureaucracy will lead to high levels of trust from the state’s citizens 
towards their government. Higher levels of transparency will contribute to higher levels 
of economic freedom and GDP per Capita at PPP. Without a higher level of trust in the 
government the internal security situation will remain weak; distrust of the government at 
large will grow, citizens will continue to defy institution, and corruption levels may 
return to levels noted during the Ben Ali regime.  
 Polity levels on the negative ten to ten scale do not change significantly with this 
scenario. This is because significant changes to the overall democratic structure of the 
government do not occur in the alternative scenario. Tunisia rests in the anocracy level of 
the polity scale, meaning the risk for insecurity within the government is strong. 
However, for a new democracy this should not be a surprise. Over the ten years of this 
scenario the polity level is set to increase from -3.45 to -2.48. This does indicate the 
democratic levels will increase in the future, decreasing insecurity.  
3.7 Major Challenges and Goal Identification 
 Several challenges present themselves into implementing these development 
changes. First there is the issue of increasing tertiary education graduation rates. While 
enrollment rates in Tunisian universities continues to boom, recruited students are not 
generally qualified for tertiary education and the system that places students in their 
fields of study do not coincide with interests.32  
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 Corruption has evolved into a large part of tertiary education due to the fact that 
the focus of enrolling university shifted from learning to obtaining a degree to fulfill 
bureaucratic requirements for future employment with the government.33 The mistrust of 
the public education system alludes to the overall citizen distrust in the Tunisian 
government. Perhaps the biggest challenge facing the reform in education is changing 
how students think of university. Without significant changes to push tertiary education 
meaning back to learning, students and graduates will continue to learn corrupt practices 
and hold little to no significance in earning a degree.  
 Further, reform needs to be undertaken in how students choose their field of 
study. The government-run computer system that works on merit and qualifications does 
not adequately meet student choices and interests. Lacking an interest in education 
further incentivizes corruption, as students who do not study their interests are more 
likely to merely use the degree to fill requirement purposes. Finally, recruiting and 
enrolling qualified students will increase graduation rates. This type of reform must begin 
in primary and secondary education levels. Teachers notoriously pass students whose 
grades do not meet passing marks.34 Pushing students through each grade level does not 
increase vitality of the overall population, instead leading to higher levels of corruption, 





34 Tristan Dreibach. "Study: Tunisian Education Improving, Major Problems Remain - See More At: 
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 Reform in education practices lies center to making this future scenario a reality. 
Levels of economic freedom need to be raised. This measure can be taken when the 
public no longer distrusts the public sector. Decreasing corruption levels in bureaucracy, 
thus increasing transparency, will yield higher levels of trust from the people. Reforming 
the corruption practices learned during education will in turn, increase efficiency of the 
government by decreasing corruption and allowing for higher levels of economic 
freedom.  
 The goal of this scenario is to increase Tunisia’s internal security situation 
through developmental reforms. Corruption plagued, and continues to plague the public 
sector. Decreasing corruption through educational reform will lead to higher levels of 
economic freedom and higher multifactor productivity. Increased transparency will yield 
more trust in the bureaucracy and help push the economic freedom multiplier levels 
presented in the scenario. Tunisia’s future rests on the efficiency of its new government 
that is backed by its citizens. Current tensions between government efficiency and 
transparency and Tunisians means the government has to become more transparent to 
earn trust. A stronger government backed by its people will increase security within the 
state’s borders.  
3.8 Alternative Scenario 
 The drivers for this study were chosen for specific reasons. The assigned values 
for the additive and multipliers hold significance because they indicate attainable and 
reasonable aggressive development goals to increase Tunisia’s internal security. 





section will highlight changes in each of these variable when values are changed for each 
driver. In this alternative scenario, mfpadd additive decreases from 0.05 to 0.03 over the 
ten-year period of the study. Second, edterger multiplier increases from 1.5 to 2.0 for ten 
years. Finally, econfree increases from 1.6 to 1.8 for the duration of this study. Each 
variable’s change is charted against the base case and then compared in value to the 
scenario presented previously.  
 Modifications made to each driver were made for situations that could occur in 
Tunisia over the next ten-year period. The originally mfpadd additive is an aggressive 
goal. This is not to say it is not attainable nor feasible, but aggressive. If the multi-factor 
productivity increased, but not to the level presented, there could be a decrease in overall 
security for Tunisians. Further, this could present a realistic scenario for Tunisia because 
it currently lies as a middle-income country and faces the possibility of falling into the 
middle-income trap. Further, reform in the ICT sector towards education (discussed later) 
highlights mfpadd’s necessity. Tertiary graduation rates were raised because of the 
possibility that decreasing corruption will lead to higher graduation rates moving in 
tandem with enrollment increases. While graduation levels may increase, this does not 
mean that corruption, GDP per Capita at PPP, or governance effectiveness will increase 
such that internal security in Tunisia will rise. Economic freedom as a multiplier is 
increased because of the vast changes involved in the new democracy’s implementation. 
Levels of this variable have already increased greatly, but further increases are possible 
due to the ruling party’s moderate religious stance and want to increase economic choice 





possibilities for alternatives that may occur within Tunisia and represent that changes in 
the four measured variables. While there may be gains, it should be noted that the 
original presented scenario presented the best-case for reforming Tunisia’s internal 
security situation.  
 First, we analyze the variable GDP per Capita at PPP. While it is noticed that the 
value increases within the alternative scenario, the value in 2025 Tunisia is 13.84 
thousands of USD in 2011, compared to 14.63 thousands of USD in 2011 when the 
drivers were in their previous form. Analysis of this variable denotes the importance of 
the multi-factor productivity additive’s stance at 0.05 presented in the original scenario.  
 
 







The second variable analyzed is Economic Freedom levels. Not surprising in this case is 
that economic freedom levels increase more rapidly when the econfree multiplier is 
increased. While full economic freedom (10 on the index) is reached in 2022 with the 
alternative scenario, and the overall line graph denotes faster increases overall, both 
scenarios present the same end-game. In the originally presented scenario full economic 
freedom levels are reached in 2024. Even though the alternative scenario presents a 
Tunisia reaching full economic freedom more quickly than the original, both have the 











Third, the variable of Governance Effectiveness is measured. In 2025 the base case 
shows Tunisia’s index level at 2.91. The alternative scenario presented raises the variable 
to 2.97. While the original scenario has an index of 3.00, not much higher than the 
alternative, the changes in this variable may not reflect the state’s true level of 
effectiveness. Pushing more students through university education and awarding a degree 
creates a further divide in Tunisian society between those who afford private tutoring or 
university professors and administrators who are corrupt and wish to send students into 
jobs without teaching. Effectiveness of the bureaucracy is difficult to measure without 
testing the level of corruption, although increases in Economic Freedom can contribute to 
increases in the effectiveness of governance. However, it should be noted that increases 
in multi-factor productivity paired with steady increases in tertiary graduation rates and 
economic freedom are best suited to raise Governance Effectiveness.  
 
 







          The fourth and final variable measured is Governance Corruption. The Base Case 
sees corruption levels decrease to 4.79 by 2025. While the alternative scenario dictates an 
increase to 4.69, the originally proposed scenario sees an increase to 4.79. Again, this 
variable treats an increase in the index as a lower level of corruption for the state. 
Increasing university graduation rates and Economic Freedom while minimally 
increasing multi-factor productivity does not produce the most viable and best-case for 
Tunisia. While Economic Freedom and university graduation rates (tied to gender  
Figure Eighteen. Governance Corruption Base Case versus Alternative Scenario. Created with 
International Futures. 
 
empowerment, however Tunisia has and continues to show high levels of female 
empowerment across the board) do not decrease corruption as strongly as adding a higher 
GDP. Multi-factor productivity’s influence on GDP per Capita at PPP lends itself 






This alternative scenario presented shows the effects of slightly changing this 
deliverable’s drivers. The results, while positive for Tunisian society, do not benefit the 
state as whole towards higher levels of internal security like the main scenario presented. 
What can be taken from this alternative scenario, its analysis, and results presented are 
actions required to attain the aggressive yet reasonable goals outlined in the main section 
of this deliverable. Further, the alternative scenario highlights the importance of each 
driver towards the intervention’s success. The numbers chosen for the additive and 
multipliers were carefully chosen and reflect a balance between all three that create the 
best-case results for improving Tunisia’s internal security.  
3.9 Action Required and Key Difficulties 
 Aggressive goals must be achieved through aggressive actions. First, the action 
required to increase tertiary graduation rates is discussed. Corruption exists through the 
primary, secondary, and tertiary educations institutions. As previously discussed the use 
of private tutors help increase knowledge for students, but this only serves higher 
socioeconomic classes who can afford this service. Second, teachers notoriously award 
passing grades for students whose results lie below the passing grade of 10. Further, 
many students attend university to obtain a degree because it is one of the requirements to 
work for the government’s bureaucracy. Additionally, instruction of the ICT branches of 
study are conducted exclusively in French at the secondary level, leaving many Tunisian 
students to pursue tertiary education in France.  
 The first, and most important action, is to undertake the fight of corruption among 





once existed, but the state’s policy changes in the early 2000’s left many educators 
underwhelmed. Increasing pay for educators is the highest complaint received, as well as 
increasing opportunities for independent research. When the government supports 
innovation and incentivizes reasons to increase education levels among students there 
will not only be a decrease in corruption but also an increase in productivity.35 This will 
also see a decrease in the use of private tutors and allow for a more equal chance for 
learning and development across various levels of socioeconomic classes. Finally, 
incentivizing teachers in all levels of education will decrease corruption. This means 
students who pass and move on to university will have the capabilities and want to study 
their profession. Universities will hold higher retention, and eventually graduation rates 
among those enrolled. Second, the Tunisian government should award scholarships for 
students to study ICT in France but with the requirement that graduates return to work in 
Tunisia within their field. Preventing a brain drain and increasing productivity in the ICT 
field will help the state move away from the possible middle-income trap scenario while 
also modernizing the country. These education reforms should not face difficulties from 
the government to reinvigorate growth and productivity among its citizens: However, 
there may be negativity from teachers who do not wish to do more. Many serve as private 
tutors for their students, earning extra income through this lucrative profession. Though if 
the incentivization program and increase in the ability to conduct independent work 







 Next we discuss Economic Freedom. The increases in this driver should not face 
many difficulties to implement or from society as a whole. The key here is the 
government understanding the needs of the people while maintaining a level of control 
necessary for order. Implementation of the democratic system is new; establishment of 
the permanent democracy is even newer. Ruling party Nidaa Tounis’s moderate stance 
has the ability to pass and implement legislation to increase Economic Freedom 
throughout the state. Tunisian people enjoy Nidaa Tounis because it stands to contrast the 
Islamist parties that ran for office and also have a solid foundation in modeling Tunisian 
democracy to fit with the cultural needs of the state. The biggest responsibility is to 
increase the relationship between the bureaucracy and Tunisian citizens. Mistrust 
between citizens and the bureaucracy stems from the latter’s notorious reputation for 
corruption. Decreasing corruption in the education system will lead to a decrease in 
corruption within bureaucracy. Students who matriculate into these positions currently 
lived through a system where passing grades can be awarded by teachers and a diploma is 
nothing more than a requirement for the workforce. Working to decrease corruption in 
education will seep into the bureaucracy because the students who no longer grew up 
surrounded by its working will begin a new generation of the system. This is not an 
overnight fix: Corruption takes years to fix. This can be seen through the scenario’s 
analysis. Even though corruption decreased, it was not by significant levels. However, 
when the first generation of students who have matriculated through primary, secondary, 
and tertiary education enter the workforce we will see the full value of corruption’s 





 Multi-factor productivity, like its namesake, is multi-faceted. The increases seen 
through the scenario are dependent on the actions taken through education and economic 
reform. As seen through the alternative scenario, all three are tied together and must be 
looked upon as a combined engine to increase internal security. The difficulty here lies 
with working to increase the educational reforms and decreasing corruption throughout 
the government most notably education and the bureaucracy overall. Increasing education 
initiatives such as scholarship program for ICT students to study in France for tertirary 
education with the promise to return and work in Tunisia will increase mfpadd and move 
the state out of the middle income trap possibility. Creating a positive and sustainable 
relationship between the Tunisian populous and its government is imperative and 
tantamount to the success not only of the security situation but overall success of the 
state.  
3.10 Conclusions from the Intervention 
 Based on current trajectory, Tunisia’s projected growth in population will level 
out the current youth bulge. However, the current problem faced from today’s youth 
bulge is the high levels of unemployment for those aged 19-34. The Tunisian government 
must continue its compulsory education throughout primary school and strive for 100% 
enrollment, but the real push must come towards students starting and finishing 
secondary school. Although more than 65% of those eligible to enroll have, higher levels 
of education will allow the government to transform its work force to a skills-based 
economy and move out of labor-intensive work. Higher education however, has 





instability for the security of the country, as the monetary and power of terrorists groups 
entices many young adults, which will be explained later. Democracy, though in its 
naissance, is proving and projected to have a positive impact on the country. While new 
freedoms and civil liberties were rejoiced by citizens, the lack of internal reform focused 
on security and implementation of democracy across all forms prevents security within 
the state.  
 In creating an alternative scenario to the Base Case, we need to foster reforms that 
help increase the trust and transparency between the government and its citizens. The 
most important aspect of this study is decreasing overall government corruption levels. 
Noting that corruption levels begin in the early years of education and continue 
throughout university where graduates generally use degrees to move into a bureaucratic 
position, corruption must be combatted in education. Fostering higher graduation rates 
among tertiary students would create higher-caliber graduates, and working to reform 
education will fight corruption. More transparency and trust between the government and 
its constituents will help increase economic freedom and overall multifactor productivity. 
There are major hurdles that must be overcome for this scenario to work, such as fixing 
the high corruption in educational programs, but this scenario’s achievement fits the 
overarching goal of increasing internal security.  
 The actions and reforms required to make this intervention work should not 
present a high degree of difficulty for the Tunisian government. The public approves of 
the ruling Nidaa Tounis party and its stance. The public welcomes democracy and its 





times. This intervention measures the changes over the next ten years, but the full effects 
of this intervention will be most seen through the generation to come. Eliminating 
corruption and its impact on students who become the workforce will be fully unveiled 
when the first class of students who matriculate all the way through tertiary education in 
a corruption-free learning environment. Further, the current fears from citizens about 
economic freedom should diminish as corruption decreases. When the relationship 
between Tunisia’s citizens and its bureaucracy turns positive overall productivity will 
increase, thus helping to increase GDP and by effect decreasing overall corruption.  
 Processes chosen for this intervention and its parameters were carefully selected 
to aid Tunisia’s overall internal security situation. The strongest motivation for the 
government should be to mend the relationship with its citizens. Stopping the notoriously 
corrupt bureaucracy at its roots will help to make this reality. Educational reform to 
eliminate corruption on all levels will not only create a working class that embraces a 
corruption-free society but will also increase graduation rates from universities by 
creating students who enroll for education and not vocational purposes. Tunisia currently 
stands in a unique position: The newly-installed democratic regime is poised to move this 
country into a new era free from corruption with strong government-citizen bonds. The 
proposed intervention seeks to rid the state of the insecurities from the citizens to build a 
government that increases productivity, frees the state from the possibility of the middle-








CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION 
 Tunisia’s security as it currently stands poses a danger to the state. The base of a 
country’s continued development lies in a strong sense of internal security. Division 
between the ISF and the rest of the country, coupled with the government’s lack of 
concrete policy towards reforming the former does not bode well for internal security. 
Further, the regional instability and increasing presence of jihadists and terrorists poses 
new threats daily. Before Tunisia begins to increase economic development projects, 
reform of the ISF needs to begin and command the government and public’s schedule. 
Understanding the reform is just as much a public spectacle as a serious government 
undertaking will firmly establish Tunisia as a secure regime.  
 Security, as the public’s top concern, faces striking lacks of transparency and 
overlap of responsibilities as well as corruption and human rights violation accusations 
across the ISF. Maintaining the ISF’s independence is important, but integrating a code 
of conduct and procedures through the ARP with the organic law process outlined in the 
constitution will add credibility and accountability to the ISF. Holding public forums to 
discuss transparency and specific duties, powers, and the mission of the ISF will decrease 





international community to increase budget transparency instead of blindly arming the 
ISF will lend to increase the security of Tunisia.  
 Only when ISF reforms take hold and provide the base for security can Tunisia 
begin to develop internal security solutions. Focusing on attack corruption and 
transparency levels through specific intervention scenarios will move Tunisia into a more 
secure state, even if the region surrounding it displays further instability. The biggest task 
for the Nidaa Tounis government is to ameliorate the relationship between the 
government and the populous. Massive mistrust still carries over from the Ben Ali 
regime, and the inefficiency and lack of transparency in the bureaucracy continue to 
threaten security. Reforms presented work to decrease corruption throughout the 
bureaucracy in the long-term, working to eliminate its presence overall. While the people 
support the democratic regime there has been no legislation or progress made towards 
Tunisia’s internal security.  
Again, Tunisia’s stance as the success in the Arab Spring movement faces threats 
from increased jihadist and terrorist activity. Political openness, economic development, 
and terrorism have strong links and interactions with each other. States with high levels 
of political openness have the ability to undertake strong programs of economic 
development and face lessened threats of terrorism. Tunisia’s strongest threat comes from 
its lack of political openness. Without establishing a base of internal security, jihadist and 
terrorist activity and attacks will continue to rise. Further, the relationship between the 
government and the public will continue to grow, halting the government’s ability to 
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